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More than just a few politicians and scientists see an imbalance 
in policy’s primary orientation toward economic goals, especially 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In view of scientific and public 
discourses on prosperity, this report analyzes how voting-eligible 
Germans, the electorate, rated the significance of different policy 
areas in 2013 and again at the beginning of 2017. It is based on 
two representative surveys conducted together with Kantar Public 
(formerly TNS Infratest), in which respondents were asked to rate 
the relevance of various policy areas. The areas included were 
based on the ten social indicators favored by the study commis-
sion, “Growth, Prosperity and Quality of Life,” and 20 out of the 
46 indicators the German government uses in its “Living Well in 
Germany” Report to describe quality of life. This report shows that 
the majority of German citizens do indeed view the areas which are 
described by the indicators as important policy dimensions.
In both 2013 and 2017, “preserving democracy” had the highest 
relevance. In 2017, “improved care for old people” was number two, 
and a “more effective battle against crime” took (by a very small 
margin) third place, followed by “full employment.” While there 
is a high consensus on the importance of these four goals, the 
assessment of the importance of further policy goals varies greatly 
across people, and there are also clear systematic differences in the 
relevance of policy areas among different social groups. The issue 
of refugees does not appear as a policy goal in the classifications 
of the commission and the government, which is why it was not 
included in the survey.
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Policy goals in the eyes of the public: 
preservation of the liberal democratic order 
remains most important
By Marco Giesselmann, Nico A. Siegel, Thorsten Spengler, and Gert G. Wagner
As an indicator for the scientific and public discourses 
on prosperity, GDP appears to be too narrow and out-
dated. The scientific community has started this discus-
sion already in the early 1970s. The rise of post-materi-
alistic movements and the Green Party brought it to the 
attention of the general public in Germany in the 1980s. 
Eventually, the report by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi raised 
broad interest,1 and, in 2011, the German Bundestag 
responded by constituting a study commission (Enquete 
Kommission) to study the issue. After two years of in-
depth consultation, the majority of the commission pro-
posed ten policy areas and indicators for their operation-
alization. Among them was GDP.2 
The members of the study commission were unanimous 
in their opinion that one single alternative indicator, a 
type of “alternative GDP” or “anti-GDP,” would not be 
useful for reasons of methodology and democratic the-
ory. If we were to compress various aspects of growth, 
prosperity, and quality of life into one unique measured 
value, the specific areas of life and individual policy goals, 
respectively, would have to be weighted—an impossible 
task given the prevailing disparity among both the gen-
eral population and the elites. This multi-dimensional-
ity of views on quality of life as well as the variation in 
significance attributed to policy goals are also reflected 
on the supply side of the political process. As analyses 
of party agendas in recent years have shown, the signif-
icance of individual policy goals is not the only variable 
factor. Their contextual orientation, for example visible in 
the range of economic policy positions between the poles 
1 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (2010): 
Mismeasuring Our Lives. New York, London. This report launched a broad “be-
yond GDP” debate in the scientific community, among policymakers, and in the 
general public. 
2 See German Bundestag, “Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission ‘Wachs-
tum, Wohlstand, Lebensqualität –Wege zu nachhaltigem Wirtschaften und 
gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft’,” Drucksache 
17/13300 (2013). One of the authors of this Economic Bulletin, Gert G. Wag-
ner, was an expert member of the “Wachstum, Wohlstand, Lebensqualität” 
study commission (2011–2013) and a scientific counsel for the German govern-
ment’s “Gut leben in Deutschland” Project from 2014 to 2016.
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mentioned above, our list of policy goals also included 
the ten areas in the 2013 survey that the study commis-
sion considered key areas.6 Because the sample design 
remained constant, replicating the indicators gave us the 
option to compare the perceived importance of different 
policy areas over time.
It is obvious that presenting a list of policy goals and 
weighting the answers afterward yields different results 
than asking open-ended questions—the approach the 
government used. The way questions are formulated also 
plays a role. Neither the study commission nor the gov-
ernment made the issue of refugees, and the overarch-
ing subject of migration, an explicit subject of discussion. 
Instead, they did so indirectly with regard to education 
and the job market. However, the subject obviously has 
great political significance right now. As part of the sur-
vey in 2017, we also asked which policy area is currently 
the most important one, without specifying any catego-
ries. Our initial rough categorization shows that many 
people put the subject of refugees at the top of the list of 
acute policy issues. Since the analysis at hand is explicitly 
targeted to evaluating the institutionally proposed indi-
cator systems, we did not include the issue on the list of 
indicators in the survey. 
We would like to repeat here that depending how the 
survey questions and the questionnaire are constructed, 
 policy areas are weighted differently by respondents. 
In this respect, the following results highlight various 
aspects of the debate on the multiple dimensions of the 
quality of life—no more and no less.7
Social indicators: an overview
Table 1 provides an overview of the indicators proposed 
by the study commission and the German government. 
In total, we list 55 indicators that were assigned to three 
dimensions according to the study commission’s struc-
tural principle. For improved clarity, the dimensions 
were divided into nine subjects that are roughly based on 
the classification system used in the government report. 
Ten indicators are at the intersection of the two projects 
and consequently straddle the relevant columns. Both 
of our surveys referred to eight of the ten indicators. We 
6 See Marco Giesselmann, Richard Hilmer, Nico A. Siegel et al. (2013), 
Measuring Well-Being: W3 Indicators to Complement GDP. DIW Economic 
Bulletin 5: 10–19.
7 We would like to note here that no single scientific method can record the 
“true” will of the people with respect to the importance of various areas of life 
without distortion or errors. For example, it is possible to ask open questions 
about what is important in life or quality of life during surveys, as the German 
government did in 2015. The results are comparable, although by no means 
identical. As the study commission and the government project were both 
targeting long-term trends, current issues were not paramount, and the policy 
area of “refugees and integration,” which has been acute since the second half 
of 2015, was not made an explicit subject. 
of regulation and liberalization, is another.3 Therefore, 
the study commission’s ten proposed indicators func-
tion as points of reference that should prove to be alter-
native models for policy in the discourse on prosperity.
Subsequent to the commission’s work, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel initiated the 
government’s project “Living Well in Germany” (Gut 
leben in Deutschland).4 Organized by the government 
and, to a greater extent, associations and other social 
organizations, more than 200 “dialogs with citizens” 
(townhall meetings) were carried out to identify relevant 
areas of well-being. In addition, around 10,000 people 
answered the dialog’s key questions (“What aspects of life 
are personally important to you?” and “What do you think 
are the main contributing factors to quality of life in Ger-
many?”) online or via postcard. Assisted by experts, the 
government derived twelve higher-level dimensions of 
the state and development of quality of life as measured 
by 46 statistical indicators from the dialogs and answers. 
Conceptually, the categories developed here differ from 
those of the study commission in two respects. First, they 
are not only the results of expert judgment but were also 
derived by interpreting dialogs between policy makers 
and heterogeneous (non-representative) groups of citi-
zens. Second, the aspects of prosperity and well-being 
recorded in the dialogs with citizens were not explicitly 
formulated as policy goals. Therefore, they do not neces-
sarily define mandates to policy makers to take specific 
actions. Nevertheless, in this report we place them side 
by side with the study commission’s indicators, explic-
itly verifying their effectiveness as policy goals. 
This approach highlights the crux of our concern: we 
intend to evaluate the relevance of the indicators as  policy 
goals among voting-eligible German citizens, the elec-
torate. For the present report, we took the 46 indicators 
proposed by the government and selected the 20 that 
we considered most important (Table 1). For instance, 
we did not select areas and indicators that are virtually 
unable to be influenced by policy in the short term, such 
as the so-called dependency ratio (number of old peo-
ple divided by number of all adults). Based on this, we 
used a representative survey to find out in a direct man-
ner the extent to which people in Germany attribute the 
status of political goal to each of the 20 areas.5 And as 
3 See, for example, Nicolas Merz and Sven Regel, “Die Programatik der 
Parteien.” In: Oskar Niedermayer (ed.), Handbuch der Parteienforschung, (Wies-
baden: Springer VS, 2013), 211–238, and Sven Regel, “Data Entry and Access: 
Introducing the Manisfesto Project Database (MPDB).”, In: Andrea Volkens, 
Judith Bara, Ian Budge et al. (eds.), Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 195–209. 
4 See German government; “Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lebensqualität 
in Deutschland,” (2016) (available online. Accessed: February 12, 2017).
5 We narrowed the field to 20 indicators in order to limit the time respond-
ents would require to answer all the questions in the representative survey.
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omitted rate of continuing education and global nitrogen 
emissions, which the study commission called second-
tier indi cators. Democracy was not mentioned directly 
in the government report, but instead was implied by 
a bundle of indicators. Importance of democracy was, 
however, part of our survey in 2013 and 2017. There are 
therefore nine indicators that can be used as a basis for 
carrying out analyses over time. They are printed in bold 
and indicated with an asterisk. 
Six of the 55 indicators were mentioned by the study com-
mission but did not appear in the government’s report. 
We put them into the left column in Table 1. Apart from 
democracy, they are not key areas in the sense of the 
study commission. This is why we did not include them 
in our surveys.
The 34 indicators that are listed in the government’s 
report but not on the study commission’s proposed list 
are in the right column.8 Eleven of these indicators were 
also included in our survey—however, only in the one 
conducted in 2017. These eleven indicators are printed 
in bold but do not have asterisks. Nitrogen emissions 
(national), which was one of the study commission’s 
key indicators, only appeared in our 2013 survey. 
Of course our selection of social indicators, and the 
underlying policy areas, respectively, is open to debate. 
However, our report does not discuss the sense of the 
different indicators in comparison to alternative con-
cepts and operationalizations—the reports of the study 
commission and the government we referred to offer 
detailed material for this type of discussion.9 Instead, we 
empirically studied a) the extent to which German citi-
zens considered the areas of life as important which the 
study commission and the government selected, b) the 
degree of dispersion in the weighting of those different 
areas, and c) the extent to which different weighting is 
linked to the socio-economic characteristics and politi-
cal values of the electorate. For this purpose, DIW Ber-
lin and TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2013) and its suc-
cessor, Kantar Public (2017), conducted one representa-
tive telephone survey (CATI) among the voting-eligible 
population in each year (Box 1).
8 The table consequently contains 44 indicators from the government’s 
report because we combined several of the original 48 areas for the purposes 
of our survey.
9 German Bundestag 2013; German government 2016.
Table 1
Overview on social indicatores of well-being
Dimensions  Subjects
Indicators of the study commission 
(2012)




Distribution Distribution of income and wealth*
Poverty risk
Prosperity GDP (per-capita income)*
Sovereign debt*
Net investments Support for scientific research
Financial sustainability Support for business founders
Share of elderly population
 Social aspects Employment Employment rate*




Compatibility of family and work 
(Working hours, daycare rate)
Rate of regular jobs
Wage level
Education Education rate*




Healthy life years Membership in sports clubs
Prevalence of obesity
Supply with medical doctors






























Greenhouse gas emissions (national)* 
Biodiversity (national)*
Nitrogen emissions (national)* Air quality
Energy productivity
Note: bold=part of the survey in 2017, *=part of the survey in 2013.
Source: Own illustration based on Bundesregierung (2016): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur  Lebensqualität 
in Deutschland, Deutscher Bundestag (2013): Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission “Wachstum, 
Wohlstand, Lebensqualität – Wege zu nachhaltigem Wirtschaften und gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt in der 
Sozialen Marktwirtschaft”.
© DIW Berlin 2017
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High dispersion among the relevance of many 
policy areas for the voting-eligible
Our most significant finding: for most policy goals, there 
is anything but consensus when it comes to the popu-
lation’s assessment of their importance. As in 2013, the 
respondents’ answers showed a high level of dispersion 
in 2017.11 In most areas, only a few respondents gave low 
ratings (between zero and five), but as the middle 50 per-
cent of the answers indicates, the majority of them were 
broadly distributed in the six-to-ten range. This leads to 
our first key conclusion: designing one single measure 
as an alternative to GDP does not do justice to the com-
plexity of measuring prosperity. It could not hope to map 
the population’s prioritization of policy areas equitably. 
Relevance of policy goals has changed little 
since 2013: preservation of democracy still 
ranked no. 1
At the same time, the prioritization of policy areas 
remained stable in the short term. Despite strong dif-
ferences in the weights across persons, the mean val-
ues showed a high level of stability from survey year to 
survey year (Figure 2). Here, we display the year-spe-
cific means of the nine areas that were part of the survey 
in both 2013 and 2017. With an almost constant mean 
weight of 9.5, the preservation of democracy and freedom 
is at the top of the list. The government’s dialogs and a 
representative survey also showed that, on average, no 
overarching goal is as important to the citizens of Ger-
many as preserving a liberal democracy.12 Thus, the note 
on the limited ability to generalize upon the prioritiza-
tion formulated above does not necessarily apply here: 
more than 80 percent of the population agree that this 
policy goal is extremely important. In an era of populist 
currents with anti-democratic tendencies within Europe 
and without, this is especially worthy of attention. 
Employment, the environment, and education 
are viewed as more important than GDP and 
sovereign debt
The importance attributed to employment has fallen by a 
statistically significant amount since 2013. This is prob-
11 See Giesselmann et al. (2013).
12 See Gert G. Wagner, Nico A. Siegel, and Thorsten Spengler, “Froh zu sein 
bedarf es wenig,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, February 5, 2017; 
Gert G. Wagner, Martin Bruemmer, Axel Glemser et al., “Dimensions of Quality 
of Life in Germany: Measured by Plain Text Responses in a Representative 
Survey (SOEP),” SOEPpapers 893 (2017), and Julia M. Rohrer, Martin Brümmer 
and Gert G. Wagner (2017), “Wen interessiert Europas Zukunft?” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, January 27, 2017. The three articles show that based on 
open-ended survey questions of what people consider important in life, “peace” 
is ranked among the top answers. However, one-third of respondents explicitly 
emphasized “social peace” and another third a peaceful world.” The remaining 
third did not further specify their statements on peace.
Efforts to preserve democracy continue to 
receive highest average ratings 
Figure 1 portrays the key statistical values for the distri-
bution of responses to our survey from January 2017.10 
The bars display the arithmetic mean of the ratings. The 
dots represent the median that divides the respondents 
into two groups of equal size. The narrow horizontal 
bars show the range of the middle 50 percent of the rat-
ings. The edges of these bars represent the range of the 
core respondents’ answers, thus illustrating the survey 
response dispersion. 
10 The arrangement of the indicators within Figure 1 is mainly oriented 
toward the mean amount. If the means of two or more indicators are identical 
to the first decimal place, their order is based on the higher percentage of 
“more important” and higher ratings.
Figure 1
Relevance of policy areas (2017)1
Survey results (ranging from 0, not important at all, to 10, very important)









Distribution of income and wealth












1 Responses to the question: “How important is it to you for German policy-makers to address the following 
issues?”
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respondents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Maintaining democracy is the most important policy goal.
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7.4, the importance of GDP (measured in the form of per-
capita income) remained relatively low. And respondents 
valued the importance of the distribution of income and 
wealth at slightly under eight points (the change from 8.0 
to 7.8 is not statistically significant). The attributed rel-
evance of sovereign debt changed to a statistically signif-
It could be that the majority of the respondents did not associate the acute 
impressions made by migration with (educational) measures that could probably 
prevent social problems. 
ably due to the currently low level of unemployment in 
Germany. However, the value of 8.9 is still considera-
bly higher than the values of 8.2 and 8.0 for reduction of 
greenhouse gases and biodiversity, respectively. Improvement 
of educational possibilities was attributed the same impor-
tance, which has fallen by 0.4 points on the scale, also a 
statistically significant amount.13 With a mean value of 
13 Considering the current debate on migration policy, which allocates a key 
role to education initiatives in achieving integration, this result may be surprising. 
Box 1
Surveys of the electorate
DIW Berlin conducted representative surveys on the relevance of 
selected policy goals among eligible voters in Germany with TNS 
Infratest in 2013 and its successor, Kantar Public, in 2017. By the 
end of January 2013, a total of 1,012 respondents had assigned a 
rating between zero (“not important at all”) and ten (“very impor-
tant”) to the ten indicators selected by the study commission of the 
Bundestag (Enquete Kommission). In the middle of January 2017, 
the survey was conducted among 1,016 persons. Eleven indicators 
(from the government report on the quality of life in Germany) 
had been added to it. Together with the indicators from 2013, the 
survey covered 19 of the 46 indicators in the government report.
This readily understandable text introduced the survey on these 
indicators: “Policy makers attend to many areas that directly 
affect people’s personal situations as well as the general trends 
in the economy and society. I am going to mention ten/twenty 
areas, and I would like you to tell me if you think they should 
play an important role in Germany’s policies or if they should 
not. To do this, please use a scale of 0 to 10. ‘0’ means that 
the area is ‘not important at all’ for policy and should not play 
a special role. ‘10’ means that the area is ‘very important’ for 
policy and should play a major role. With the values in between 
you can fine-tune your opinion.”
If asked, the interviewers explained that they were only interested 
in relevance for policy and not the respondents’ personal atti-
tudes to the areas. In 2013 the following areas were specified:
1. Average per capita income in Germany 
2. Distribution of income and wealth 
3. Sovereign debt 
4. As many people as possible have jobs 
5. People’s life expectancy should continue to rise 
6. More students earn a higher or university degree1 
1 There was an additional interviewer instruction here: “If you receive 
questions: ‘higher’ means that more young people receive degrees that are 
7. Preservation of democracy and freedom in Germany 
8. Reduction in the emission of harmful greenhouse gases 
9. Reduction in the harmful excess nitrogen that we produce
10. Preservation of biodiversity and stopping extinction
In the first three areas a direction was not specified, since obvi-
ously not all people want more or less income (we considered per 
capita income easier to understand than GDP), equality in the dis-
tribution of income and wealth, and sovereign debt. In the other 
seven areas, it is clear what respondents would aspire to and the 
direction is contained in the question to make it easier to answer.2
In 2017, the question on “excess nitrogen” was omitted. And we 
added the following areas: 
10. Improving the quality of care for the elderly
11. More effective fight against crime 
12. Better compatibility of family and work 
13. Increase voter turnout 
14. More support for scientific research 
15. Increase in job satisfaction 
16. Rent control 
17. Improvement in public transportation 
18. Higher level of development assistance 
19. Increase in the number of people who do volunteer work 
20. Reduction in commuting time 
higher than the certificate for leaving school (the qualification to enroll in 
a university, for example). Either directly in school or through continuing 
education programs.” 
2 To minimize the influence of the question order on the answers, ques-
tions were asked in randomized order. In 2013, the questions were rand-
omized by block, and in 2017 they rotated (virtually) freely across all posi-
tions. This allowed us to control for the effect of the question’s position on 
response behavior – which the data indeed document. We were unable to 
control for other conceivable methodological effects. For example, the word-
ing of questions and specifications and the scale for rating importance (for 
example, yes/no or the 11-point scale) could have also played a role. 
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icant extent, falling from 8.3 to 7.5 points. This is surely 
due to the favorable state of the federal budget. In the 
political debate, its robust condition is allowing for more 
vociferous calls for strengthening government invest-
ment with debt financing instead of clinging to the pri-
macy of the zero lower bound. 
Proper care more important than higher life 
expectancy
The recent survey confirmed the low significance attrib-
uted to increasing life expectancy in 2013—with a weight 
of 6.6, it held second to last place. At the same time, the 
very high weight that improving the quality of care for the 
elderly received (included for the first time in 2017 and 
ranked no. 2, see Figure 1) indicated that, within the area 
of health, people are much more interested in having a 
satisfactory quality of life when they are old. Among the 
indicators originating in the government’s report that 
were included in our survey for the first time in 2017, 
only the fight against crime in Germany received ratings 
as high as those of improving the care situation. 
Findings on other policy areas
Among the eleven policy areas that were included in the 
survey for the first time in 2017, three appear in the top 
half of the ranking (Figure 1): strengthen research, increase 
voter turnout, and improving the compatibility of family 
and work. These indicators all showed mean weights of 
just under eight points. 
At 6.9 points, improving development assistance had the 
fourth-lowest rank in the table, and fostering volunteer 
work was also in the lower range at 6.8 points. Encour-
aging volunteer work may be an important concern of 
German citizens and politicians but obviously is not per-
ceived as being a policy-related task. The same may hold 
true for reducing commuting time to work, which is at the 
bottom of the ranking. 
Ratings vary according to demographic and 
social characteristics
The electorate was virtually unanimous in its agreement 
that the four areas at the top of the ranking are very 
important political goals. However, the weights of the 
remaining indicators fluctuated markedly among per-
sons. To some extent, these fluctuations showed a pat-
tern that can be explained on the basis of various socio-
economic and demographic characteristics: this is why 
we systematically analyzed which personal characteris-
tics are decisive in yielding different prioritization results. 
For the nine indicators that we examined in both 2013 
and 2017, we were also able to study the stability of socio-
demographic influences. 
Descriptive findings show significant 
differentiation by gender, region, age, and 
political party preference
For eastern Germany, some attributions of importance 
are substantially higher than those of western Germany 
(Figure 3, left panel). This holds especially true for the pol-
icy goals of commuting time reduction (which is weighted 
higher in eastern Germany) and job satisfaction (see dis-
cussion below). In almost all areas, women tended to 
give higher ratings than men (Figure 3, right panel). 
This finding was apparent in the 2013 survey and has 
since established itself. The ecological and sustainabil-
ity-related indicators of biodiversity, greenhouse gases, and 
development assistance are most strongly affected. A look 
at age groups revealed that older people were more likely 
Figure 2
Relevance of policy areas (2013 and 2017)1
Survey results (ranging from 0, not important at all, to 10, very important)





























*** Difference 2013 vs. 2017 is highly significant (p<0.001).
1 Responses to the question: “How important is it to you for German policy-makers to address the following 
issues?“
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respondents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Hardly any change in the rating of policy goals between 2013 and 2017.
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economic and demographic factors. With the help of 
regression analyses, we highlight which differences are 
statistically significant and those that are not. 
Regression analyses show statistically 
significant influences by gender and party 
preference
We calculated regression models for each of the 20 policy 
areas (Box 2). Table 2 includes the study commission indi-
cators whose influencing factors we were able to compare 
over time. We present the results for the government’s 
indicators, which were only surveyed in 2017, in Table 3. 
to give higher ratings to almost all policy goals (Figure 4). 
The correlation was the strongest in areas that play major 
roles in the lives of older people, such as volunteer work, 
life expectancy, and public transportation. However, it also 
holds true for some of the policy areas that are particu-
larly relevant for younger people: job, research, and com-
muting time reduction. For this reason, the findings are 
not skewed to the self-centered valuation pattern of older 
persons. 
Likewise, there were several noteworthy differences in 
the attributions of importance by party preference. In the 
following section, we present and statistically test these 
differences and those established on the basis of socio-
Figure 3
Relevance of policy areas (2017) by region (left-hand panel)1 and gender (right-hand panel)1
Survey results (ranging from 0, not important at all, to 10, very important)
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1 Responses to the question: “How important is it to you for German policy-makers to address the following issues?“
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respondents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Especially indicators related to employment issues receive higher ratings in eastern Germany.
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The number of observations in each model varies, since 
not all of the respondents answered every question. 
The first rows of Tables 2 and 3 show differences by spe-
cific region and for the most part, confirm the tenden-
cies of the unadjusted disparities between eastern and 
western Germany (Figure 3, right panel). Although the 
descriptive findings clearly suggest differences in the 
relevance of job satisfaction between eastern and west-
ern Germany, the regression analyses showed that this 
effect is probably due to the lower level of income in east-
ern Germany. On the contrary, the findings with regard 
to biodiversity, reduction in commuting time, and volunteer 
work remained unchanged. The mean differences are 
particularly large (and statistically significant) for com-
muting time reduction (0.7 points on the scale). We can 
take this difference as an indication that structural prob-
lems in eastern Germany may have led to specific, indi-
vidual burdens in the form of longer commutes to work. 
As a consequence, the concrete awareness that there is 
a problem has grown and taken the form of a mandate 
to the political system. 
Women tended to attribute above-average relevance 
across the board. This tendency has become stronger 
for many indicators since 2013, as shown by the arrows 
in Table 2. Specifically, weights of subjects with a ref-
erence to sustainability show strong gender differ-
ences (compare also Figure 3, right panel). On aver-
age, women rated the importance of preserving biodi-
versity and reducing greenhouse gases significantly higher 
than men by one-half of a point. For development assis-
tance, the average difference is more than one point 
on the scale. 
In general, the relationship of the ratings with age has 
fallen substantially since 2013. If the mean rating of a 
person over 45 was around 0.6 points above that of a 
person under 30 in 2013, the gap between the mean rat-
ings was less than 0.3 points on the scale in 2017. As 
the arrows on Table 2 show, alongside the reduction of 
greenhouse gases, the importance of per capita income is 
especially affected by this change. We will have to wait 
for the results of future surveys to find out if this is a 
stable trend.
Holding demographic and economic characteristics con-
stant, persons with a university entrance qualification 
(Abitur) gave all social indicators below-average impor-
tance—just as they did in 2013. People with a university 
entrance qualification therefore appear to be somewhat 
more relaxed than people without it. The same applies to 
income effects. Striking here is that especially the indi-
cators on the lower end of the ranking show the strong-
est differences across income groups; people with more 
wealth are possibly not affected by increases in rents for 
housing since they may rather own property or are them-
selves landlords. They may also not be dependent on pub-
lic transportation to the same extent either—both of which 
are policy goals that were lower on the scale for high-
income respondents than people with lower incomes 
by more than one-half of a point. It is also striking that 
the rating for preserving democracy as a policy goal was 
(clearly and statistically significantly) below average—as 
it also was in 2013. 
Figure 4
Relevance of policy areas (2017), by age1
Survey results (ranging from 0, not important at all, to 10, very important)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









Distribution of income and wealth











1 Responses to the question: “How important is it to you for German policy-makers to address the following 
issues?”
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respondents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Older persons assign higher ratings not only to policy areas that directly affect them.
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reducing greenhouse gases stood out as a relevant pol-
icy goal. In comparison to people who intend to vote for 
other parties, the difference was significant, amounting 
to 1.3 (in comparison to the populistic Alternative for Ger-
many Party, Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), 0.7 (CDU/
CSU), and 0.4 (SPD) points on the scale. 
Moreover, the below-average importance that Green Party 
supporters attributed to the political goal of reducing crime 
is also noteworthy. The differences between the Greens 
and the AfD and Union parties happened to be statisti-
cally significant. The below average rating in this area 
could be interpreted as a reaction to the way the subject 
has been co-opted by conservative or right-leaning par-
ties and movements. At the same time, we should men-
tion the caveat that people who preferred the Green Party 
also ranked fighting crime as one of the five most impor-
tant policy goals.
As expected, the ratings of AfD supporters were the high-
est on the subject of crime. Controlling for demographic 
and socio-economic factors, on average they attributed 
higher (and statistically significant) importance to the pol-
Our analysis of the supporters of the various parties 
shows meaningful and statistically significant differenc-
es.14 Many of the differences are logical, given the back-
ground of the parties’ fundamental political agendas and 
current areas of prioritization. For example, supporters 
of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Par-
tei Deutschlands, SPD) and the Left Party (Die Linke) give 
especially high ratings to the distribution of income and 
wealth. Even when statistically controlling for place of 
residence and income, in comparison to the supporters 
of the two Union parties (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands, CDU and Christlich-Soziale Union in Bay-
ern, CSU), on average they rated this goal higher by more 
than one point (Left Party) and 0.6 points (SPD) respec-
tively. For supporters of the Green Party (Die Grünen), 
14 In our survey, party preference was measured based on the well-known 
“Sunday question:” “Which party would you vote for if federal elections were 
held this Sunday?” Due to the relatively small percentage of people who pre-
ferred the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokraten, FDP) and the populistic 
“Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in our sample, the 
number of analyzable cases in the two categories was below 100. This qualifies 
the robustness of the results in the relevant categories and explains why even 
marked deviations of numbers are often not statistically significant. 
Box 2
Multivariate analyses
Multivariate analyses (“regression analyses”) show the extent to 
which the attributions of importance in the study differ along 
socio-economic characteristics (eastern/western Germany, gen-
der, age, education, household income, party preference) when 
all other influences are held constant. For each indicator, the 
coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 show the average mean deviation 
of the ratings in comparison to those in the reference category. 
For example, in the job analysis, the coefficient of 0.54 for the 
characteristic female showed that on average, women rate the 
importance of the increase employment policy goal around one-
half of a point higher (on the scale of 0 to 10) than men do. The 
arrow pointing upward indicates a significant increase in the 
difference since 2013.
In comparison to a simple presentation of differences in mean 
values, the regression analyses offer two practical advantages. 
First, group-specific differences can be directly tested for statisti-
cal significance. The coefficients that indicate a non-random 
relationship are marked with either one asterisk (p<5 percent, 
significant), two asterisks (p<1 percent, very significant), or 
three asterisks (p<0.1 percent, highly significant). Further, the 
regression coefficients control for the influence of other struc-
tural characteristics and may therefore be interpreted as effects 
of the underlying characteristics, unlike simple descriptive 
comparisons of group specific mean values. For example, if more 
people with low household incomes live in eastern Germany and 
household income has an effect on attribution of importance, 
the importance of place of residence is overestimated descrip-
tively while the regression analysis yields an adjusted coefficient 
for eastern Germany.1 
The regression model’s explanatory power is described using 
the coefficient of determination, R2. It captures the proportion 
of total variation of the dependent variable the model can 
statistically explains by means of the independent variables in 
the regression. In the present analyses, the R2 was between five 
and 13 percent. In the context of social sciences, this is a solid 
share of explained variance that indicates the relevance of the 
personal characteristics involved. However, it also showed that 
the characteristics studied did not capture the major share of 
the variation in ratings. Alongside the socio-economic factors 
analyzed, we therefore suspect that characteristics like individual 
psycho-emotional disposition, leisure time behavior, and media 
consumption are further important rating determinants.
1 Since the significance of the study commission’s indicators was al-
ready surveyed in 2013, we were able to make cross-comparisons between 
influencing factors in 2013 and 2017 using these indicators. If the change 
between 2013 and 2017 is statistically significant (p<5 percent), an arrow 
in the relevant cell indicates the direction of the change.
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icy goal of reducing crime by more than 0.5 scale points 
than people who preferred the CDU/CSU, SPD, and the 
Green Party. At the same time, the rating for development 
assistance was clearly below average. The (statistically sig-
nificant) average difference to supporters of the Union 
parties and SPD was approximately 1.5 points. The clearly 
below-average rating of the preserving democracy policy 
goal among persons who intend to vote for the AfD was 
also striking. However, just under 75 percent of persons 
who prefer the AfD still gave the policy goal of preserv-
ing democracy the highest rating. It would therefore be 
unfair to make a blanket statement that AfD supporters 
basically reject democracy. Nevertheless, those people 
who gave preserving democracy low ratings as a policy 
goal appear to be gathered under the AfD banner15—a 
phenomenon that does not have its counterpart on the 
left pole of the political spectrum. 
15 These findings are basically in agreement with broader studies on the com-
position and value systems of AfD voters. See Oskar Neidermayer and Jürgen 
Hofrichter, “Die Wählerschaft der AfD: Wer ist sie, woher kommt sie und wie 
weit rechts steht sie?” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 47 (2) (2016): 267–85, 
as well as Martin Kroh and Karolina Fetz, “Das Profil der AfD-AnhängerInnen 
hat sich seit Gründung der Partei deutlich verändert.” DIW Wochenbericht 
34/2016: 711–719. 
Table 2
Determinants of the importance of policy areas: indicators of the study commission 
OLS regression results















Eastern Germany −0.23 0.23 −0.22 0.07 −0.38* 0.40* 0.16 0.32 −0.02↓
Gender
(Reference: male)
Female 0.29** 0.54***↑ 0.57*** 0.32 0.77*** 0.82***↑ 0.26 0.63***↑ 0.26
Age group
(Reference: 18 to 29 years)
30 to 44 years 0.02 0.03 −0.41 0.57 −0.04↓ −0.01 −0.25 −0.70*↓ −0.14
45 to 59 years 0.25 0.04↓ −0.32 0.62* 0.05 −0.03 0.02 −1.04***↓ −0.05↓
Above 60 years 0.29 0.55** −0.28 0.39 0.36↓ 0.11 0.23 −0.85***↓ 0.28
Education
(Reference: no Abitur)
Abitur −0.20 −0.59*** −0.55** −0.72*** −0.22 −0.19↑ −0.38* −0.74*** −0.82***
Household income
(Reference: 0 to 1500 Euro)
1500–3000 Euro 0.29* 0.21 −0.21 0.15 0.33 0.35 −0.17↓ −0.40↓ −0.71**
3000 Euro and above 0.37* 0.25 0.06 0.35 0.36 0.25 −0.15 −0.37 −0.90**
Voting intention
(Reference: CDU/CSU)
SPD −0.17 −0.09 0.17 −0.40 0.35 0.63* 0.66** 0.62* 0.26
Bündnis 90/The Greens −0.05 0.03 −0.05 −0.19 0.70* 0.62 0.19 −0.24 −0.25
FDP 0.09 −0.26 −0.61 0.41 −0.13↑ −0.07↑ 0.10 −0.18 −0.62
Left Party 0.17 0.55* 0.36 −0.10 0.49 1.02* 1.04** 0.79* 0.64
AfD −1.01*** 0.31 −0.17 0.07 −0.63* 0.86* 0.79* 0.33 −0.11
Non-voters −0.83*** 0.20 0.29 0.39 −0.29 0.09 0.68* 1.24*** −0.73
Others −0.33* 0.01 −0.11 0.21 −0.01 0.24 0.44* 0.24 −0.18
Constant 9.17*** 8.30*** 8.33*** 6.79*** 7.49*** 6.88*** 7.37*** 7.98*** 7.35***
Observations 860 859 856 852 864 864 856 849 848
R² 0.068 0.090 0.045 0.045 0.070 0.055 0.045 0.102 0.058
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001.
Upward/downward arrow: Significant (p<0.01) increase/decrease of coefficient compared to 2013.
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respondents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Socio-demographic factors are substantial and significant determinants of ratings of policy goals.
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higher (by one-half of a point on the scale) than SPD vot-
ers did. And the policy goal of an improved compatibility 
of family and work, which targets higher participation of 
mothers in the job market, also showed the gap between 
them and the SPD (as well as the other parties). On aver-
age, people who prefer the CDU/CSU parties rated it more 
than one-half of a point (and statistically significantly) 
lower than SPD, Green Party, and Left Party voters did. 
Election research has provided several models for 
explaining the high level of agreement between party 
agendas and voter policy preferences. First, parties use 
The answer profile of CDU/CSU supporters was domi-
nated by their primarily below-average ratings. For pur-
poses of comparison: across all indicators, the average 
attribution of relevance by a person who prefers the CDU/
CSU was 0.3 points below a SPD supporter (and was even 
lower among FDP supporters). This finding can be under-
stood as a basic preference for restrained government 
intervention policies on the part of people who prefer the 
Union (and particularly, the FDP). However, at second 
glance the conservative profile of CDU/CSU supporters 
also becomes apparent. They clearly, although not statis-
tically significantly, rated the policy area of sovereign debt 
Table 3




























Eastern Germany −0.03 −0.10 0.13 0.21 −0.28 0.41 0.08 −0.21 −0.17 −0.63* 0.63*
Gender
(Reference: male)
Female 0.47** 0.42** −0.24 0.56** 0.57** 0.44* 0.68** 0.33* 1.12** 0.25 0.39*
Age group
(Reference: 18 to 29 years)
30 to 44 years 0.19 0.83** −0.30 0.36 −0.47 −0.50 −1.11** −0.21 −0.84* −0.04 −1.18**
45 to 59 years 0.25 0.33 −0.28 −0.02 −0.45 −0.34 −0.43 1.09** −1.03** −0.08 −0.83*
Above 60 years 0.32 0.47* 0.60* −0.29 0.27 0.38 −0.02 1.36** −0.65* 0.71* −0.12
Education
(Reference: no Abitur)
Abitur −0.57** −0.79** 0.29 −0.23 −0.36 −0.42* −0.46* 0.11 −0.34 −0.24 −0.45*
Household income
(Reference: 0 to 1500 Euro)
1500–3000 Euro −0.11 0.00 −0.20 −0.28 0.10 −0.28 −0.02 −0.25 −0.09 −0.33 −0.18
3000 Euro and above −0.24 −0.08 −0.17 −0.30 0.23 0.17 −0.78* −0.57* −0.13 −0.59* −0.36
Voting intention
(Reference: CDU/CSU)
SPD 0.03 −0.13 −0.34 0.63* 0.62* −0.15 0.09 0.31 0.25 −0.01 0.61
Bündnis 90/The Greens −0.22 −0.55* −0.31 0.59 0.14 −0.32 0.18 0.57 0.07 −0.31 0.25
FDP 0.02 −0.04 0.04 0.11 0.28 −0.78 0.10 −0.78 −0.71 −1.01* −0.52
Left Party 0.21 −0.46 −0.01 0.97* 0.76 0.39 1.23* 0.18 −0.15 −0.74 1.01*
AfD −0.18 0.48* −0.12 1.18** −0.09 0.42 −0.38 −0.33 −1.61** −0.47 1.58**
Non-voters −0.57* 0.07 −0.17 0.81* −1.62** 0.90* 0.40 0.73 −0.34 0.21 0.40
Others 0.10 −0.13 −0.30 0.72** −0.14 0.36 0.44* 0.10 −0.38 0.04 0.81*
Constant 8.79** 8.66** 8.05** 7.19** 7.70** 7.32** 7.52** 6.33** 7.45** 6.98** 6.06**
Observations 862 862 858 860 858 858 850 856 852 855 845
R² 0.094 0.104 0.063 0.062 0.086 0.063 0.134 0.115 0.119 0.066 0.091
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001.
Source: Kantar Public (January 2017), 1016 respndents, calculations of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2017
Socio-demographic factors are substantial and significant determinants of ratings of policy goals.
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of importance was high, especially when the most impor-
tant four indicators were excluded. This dispersion once 
again underlines the methodological impossibility of cal-
culating an aggregated overall indicator as an alternative 
to GDP in a way that does justice to the preferences of 
all the people in Germany.
Conclusions
In the eyes of the electorate in Germany, per capita 
income and therefore, GDP, is not tremendously impor-
tant. On the contrary, the results of two representative 
surveys of over 1,000 voting-eligible persons in Germany 
conducted in 2013 and 2017 respectively show that GDP 
has a significantly lower priority than that of the preser-
vation of democracy. Safeguarding the quality of care for 
old people, fighting crime, and raising employment receive 
ratings similar to those of preserving democracy. Across 
regions, gender, age and political party affiliation, these 
four policy areas were recognized as important policy 
goals. As policy areas, they are by far the most important 
and clearly set apart from the other areas which were sur-
veyed. However, since many of the areas are, to a certain 
extent, also associated with GDP and economic growth, 
the public debate will continue accordingly. 
Despite the heterogeneity of individual rating patterns, 
the ranking resulting from the survey delivers clear ref-
erence points for judging the competitiveness of vari-
ous political agendas. Based on our results, big parties 
can be successful in the democratic competition only if 
they proactively advocate the preservation of democracy, 
address the increasing need for care in an aging society, 
and present transparent profiles in the areas of public 
safety and employment policy.
their mission statements to attract people with congru-
ent political preferences. Conversely, the “classical rep-
resentation thesis” of systemic political thought assumes 
that parties know their voters’ potential and preferences 
and factor them in when setting their thematic priori-
ties.16 Based on socio-psychological explanatory mod-
els, it seems plausible that people with specific party 
policy preferences anchor their own prioritization to 
their parties’ prioritization and guidelines, that is, they 
experience “positive reinforcement” by reducing cogni-
tive dissonance.17 
In conclusion, regardless of all the contextual and statisti-
cally important differences revealed in the present study, 
the analysis also showed a relatively large consensus in 
the rating of policy goals among various socio-economic 
groups. Virtually none of the characteristic dispersions 
examined showed differences in ratings that exceed a 
full point on the scale on average. Even with regard to 
party preferences, we only observed this for AfD and Left 
Party supporters. Accordingly, the ranking of the goals 
in all subgroups of society was relatively similar. How-
ever, within the groups the dispersion of the attribution 
16 For an overview of the interaction between party policy agendas and voter 
preferences, see Russell J. Dalton, “Political Parties and Political Representation: 
Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations,” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 18 (1985): 267–99.
17 The motif of dissonance reduction established in social psychology is delin-
eated substantially in Leon Festinger, Theorie der Kognitiven Dissonanz, 2nd ed. 
(Bern: Hogrefe Verlag, 2012). The high mean AfD rating for work-family balance 
is seemingly atypical. Controlling for structural characteristics, it is higher than 
for all the other parties. The differences to the CDU and FDP are statistically 
significant and on average, are greater than one point on the scale. This could 
be explained by the fact that AfD supporters do not want to improve the work-
life balance with improved daycare facilities, but instead by supporting moth-
ers’ non-participation in the job market.
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